Theological Science and Logic, III
Kant criticized Leibniz’s belief that ontology and the study of beings could prove the e
xistence of God by logic alone. I must reject Kant’s criticism because I use logic to (1) prove the existence of God, (2) distinguish God from the universe precisely, and (3) connect God to the universe permanently.
In my proof, I say that ‘all finite things are originated by an infinite thing.’ (See p. 6 of my book.) This proof relates all finite things logically to one infinite thing. In the one infinite thing, all finite things and their attributes must thus be denied. And in all finite things, one infinite thing and its attributes must also be denied. In my proof of God, the concepts, infinite and finite, coexist necessarily. Thus, these two concepts have always been together. Otherwise, the meanings of these different things could not be differentiated by our symbolic languages.
In the Second Preface to Second Edition of his book on Critique of Pure Reason (translation by Norman Kemp Smith, p. 17), Kant says, ‘... that to the present day this logic has not been able to advance a single step, and is thus to all appearance is a completed body of doctrine.’ Thus, we must reject this Kantian statement and continue the development of the science of logic.
xistence of God by logic alone. I must reject Kant’s criticism because I use logic to (1) prove the existence of God, (2) distinguish God from the universe precisely, and (3) connect God to the universe permanently.In my proof, I say that ‘all finite things are originated by an infinite thing.’ (See p. 6 of my book.) This proof relates all finite things logically to one infinite thing. In the one infinite thing, all finite things and their attributes must thus be denied. And in all finite things, one infinite thing and its attributes must also be denied. In my proof of God, the concepts, infinite and finite, coexist necessarily. Thus, these two concepts have always been together. Otherwise, the meanings of these different things could not be differentiated by our symbolic languages.
In the Second Preface to Second Edition of his book on Critique of Pure Reason (translation by Norman Kemp Smith, p. 17), Kant says, ‘... that to the present day this logic has not been able to advance a single step, and is thus to all appearance is a completed body of doctrine.’ Thus, we must reject this Kantian statement and continue the development of the science of logic.
posted by George Shollenberger @ 9:55 AM
1 Comments:
At 5:07 PM,
Anonymous said…
I think so because the realm of math and logic, and hence both theoretical and applied sciences are largely incomplete and ought to be expanded on out of necessity of the pursuit of knowledge. Nature seeks to understand and to take command of itself through the conscious mind and through the reiterative discoveries and inventions that the conscious mind reveals to itself. All things that are possible are possible, and all things that are impossible remain impossible, but our minds just don't fully know which is which yet, but we are constantly hypothesising and testing and discovering the truth which may or may not always be good news. Well, the good news comes in the form of conquering nature (cure for cancer, curing world hunger, ending self-destructive wars/superstitions, etc.), but the bad news comes in the form of nature conquering us (floods, disasters, asteroids, climate change, etc.). I think that not allowing ourselves to be conquered by nature is a call to action by scientists, politicians, and businesses alike.
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